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The home mortgage interest deduction creates incentives to buy more
housing and to become a homeowner, and the case for the deduction rests
on social benefits from housing consumption and homeownership. There
is little evidence suggesting large externalities from the level of housing
consumption, but there appear to be externalities from homeownership.
Externalities from living around homeowners are far too small to justify
the deduction. Externalities from home ownership are larger, but the
home mortgage interest deduction is a particularly poor instrument for
encouraging homeownership because it is targeted at the wealthy, who
are almost always homeowners. The irrelevance of the deduction is sup-
ported by the time series, which shows that the ownership subsidy moves
with inflation and has changed significantly between 1965 and today, but
the homeownership rate has been essentially constant.
1. INTRODUCTION
The American subsidy of homeownership is among the most prominent
features of our tax code. In 1999, $773 billion was deducted by 40 million38 Glaeser & Shapiro
homeowners using the home mortgage interest deduction. After state
taxes, it is the most common deduction, and it stands as one of the
most striking and one of the most debated features of the U.S. tax
code.
To its detractors, the home mortgage interest deduction is a boondoggle
that robs the U.S. Treasury and subsidizes America's wealthiest home-
owners, the construction industry, and quite possibly politically active
banks and entities like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. To these critics, the
deduction stands as glaring evidence for Director's Law—redistribution
ultimately goes to the median voter. The critics of the deduction argue
that it distorts behavior and induces Americans to spend too much on
housing. Some analysts, such as Voith (1999), even blame the plight of
the inner cities on the housing subsidy.
To its supporters, the home mortgage interest deduction is a corner-
stone of American society. Homeownership gives people a stake in soci-
ety and induces them to care about their neighborhoods and towns. By
subsidizing property ownership, the deduction induces people to invest
and then to have a stake in our democracy. Ownership makes people vote
for long-run investments instead of short-run transfers. Home ownership,
and perhaps housing consumption itself, seems to be good for the out-
comes of children. The deduction may favor the rich, but after all, much
of the tax code is progressive and the home mortgage interest deduction
levels the playing field a little.
We believe that there is truth to both views. The home mortgage interest
deduction, like almost all deductions, disproportionately favors the
wealthy. In 2001, more than 50 percent of taxes saved by deductions were
saved by the richest decile in America. Furthermore, a rich body of eco-
nomic research shows how the deduction increases, and possibly distorts,
housing consumption.
However, there appear to be externalities both from homeownership
and from housing consumption itself. Causal inference is tricky, but
homeownership is strongly correlated with political activism and social
connection. Homeownership appears to increase home maintenance and
gardening. Most tellingly, people seem to be willing to pay more to live
around homeowners. Controlling for metropolitan area and for the ob-
servable human capital of neighbors, we find that a 10 percent increase
in the local homeownership rate increases local housing prices by 1.5 per-
cent. While omitted unobservable variables might explain this correlation,
the overall body of research seems to confirm positive externalities from
homeownership.
The evidence suggests externalities that might be worth subsidizing,
but the home mortgage interest deduction does not appear to be an effec-The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 39
FIGURE 1. Homeownership and Inflation, 1965-2000*
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* Subsidy series shows the effect of federal taxes on the price of owner-occupied housing, based on the
twelve-month CPI inflation rate prior to the first quarter of each year. Data from www.freelunch.com.
See section 3 for a discussion of the calculation of the subsidy. Homeownership rate is the estimated rate
for the first quarter of each year. Data from www.census.gov.
tive means of subsidizing ownership.
1 While the deduction appears to
increase the amount spent on housing, it also appears to have almost no
effect on the homeownership rate. The best evidence for this claim is the
simple time series shown in Figure 1. Since 1965, the inflation rate has
soared and collapsed, causing the subsidy to homeownership similarly
to rise and fall [our formula for the subsidy is based on Poterba (1992)].
As Figure 2 also shows, changes in the tax code have caused itemization
rates to rise and fall. If the tax code affected homeownership powerfully,
we might expect a relationship between itemization rates and homeown-
ership, but as Figure 2 shows, there is no such relationship. Since the
1960s, the homeownership rate has barely budged, staying within a fixed
band between 63 and 68 percent. The changes in the itemization rate that
have occurred seem more related to the suburbanization of the economy
than to the subsidy created by the deduction.
1 When we speak of the home mortgage interest deduction as a subsidy, we mean to com-
pare it to a benchmark of our current tax system absent the deduction, rather than to alterna-
tive tax policies such as a consumption tax.40 Glaeser & Shapiro
FIGURE 2. Trends in Itemization, 1965-2000
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This relative invariance of the homeownership rate shouldn't surprise
us. Homeownership is almost perfectly linked with the type of housing
structure. People living in single-family detached units usually own and
people who live in multifamily units rent. Because this stock of housing
is relatively fixed in the short run, we shouldn't expect much of a response
in the homeownership rate to any short-run fluctuations. In the long run
though, the power of the home mortgage interest deduction to affect
homeownership is also likely to be small. The groups that are really on
the homeownership margin (the poor and the young) rarely use the de-
duction, even when they are owners. Thus, the deduction is unlikely to
influence the homeownership rate. The limited impact of the deduction
on homeownership means that there is little distortion of the ownership
margin due to the home mortgage interest deduction and, as such, the
deduction serves mainly to increase housing consumption and to change
the progressiveness of the tax code.
2
1.1 Plan of the Paper
In section 2 of this paper, we review basic facts about itemization, the
home mortgage interest deduction, and homeownership. First, we review
2 While some authors attack the deduction because it makes the income tax code less progres-
sive, it is not obvious to us that making the tax code more progressive is a beneficial goal.The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 41
the distribution of itemization throughout the population. Even among
homeowners, itemization is extremely rare in the bottom deciles of the
population. As a result, the home mortgage interest deduction creates tax
savings overwhelmingly for the top deciles of the income distribution.
Second, we review the correlates of homeowner ship. Homeownership
is particularly correlated with housing structure. People who live in
multifamily dwellings rent—people who live in single-family detached
houses own. We believe that this situation stems from agency problems
related to home maintenance. Housing structure itself is very highly cor-
related with age and position in the life cycle. An overwhelmingly large
share of nonpoor Americans who are married live in single-family houses.
Together, these facts mean that the home mortgage interest deduction
affects a subset of the population that almost never rents.
In section 3 of the paper, we review the economics of the home mort-
gage interest deduction. This deduction creates an incentive both to
consume more housing and to own. In section 4, we consider evidence
on possible externalities from housing consumption and home quality,
rather than homeownership itself. In section 5, we turn to the theory be-
hind the social benefits of homeownership. There are three ways that
homeownership might create externalities. First, homeowners might take
better care of their property, which might create externalities. Second,
because they own an asset whose value is tied to the quality of their com-
munity, homeowners might work harder to make their community pleas-
ant. Third, homeowners face higher mobility costs, which might induce
them to invest more in their community. We find evidence for all of these
channels.
In section 6, we look at homeownership and neighborhood externali-
ties. First, and most obviously, is maintenance/gardening. While it
sounds trivial, there is little doubt that owners spend more time main-
taining their houses and gardens, and panel evidence suggests that this
characteristic is not just the result of different people being homeown-
ers—people take better care of their houses when they own. This effect
appears to create at least 50 percent of any spillovers from homeown-
ership. There is also evidence suggesting that homeowners are more in-
volved in local social groups and are more likely to work to solve local
problems. In section 6, we also consider the consequences of homeown-
ership for local politics. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) showed that home-
owners are more likely to vote locally. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998)
and Monroe (2001) showed that municipalities with homeowners are par-
ticularly likely to spend more on schools and streets and less on social
welfare and hospitals. Theory predicts that homeowners favor policies42 Glaeser & Shapiro
that increase property values in their areas, while renters tend to favor
immediate handouts. As a result, homeowners seem to favor longer-term
local investments and, through the political process, homeownership may
indeed create positive externalities.
The homeowners' desire to keep property values up has a dark side,
however. Homeowners, not renters, have been more aggressive in fight-
ing racial integration, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. More recently,
homeowners have spearheaded the movement to limit new housing sup-
ply, which has artificially inflated housing throughout the United States.
Essentially, as owners have organized, they have started to act like local
cartels, restricting new entry into the market: the downside to having indi-
viduals who have incentives to keep price up.
Section 7 examines three other possible externalities from home-
ownership. Homeowners are more likely to vote in national elections
and they are more likely to vote Republican. We remain undecided
about whether that creates externalities. Green and White (1997) have
shown that the children of homeowners are more successful than the
children of renters. The mechanism through which homeownership
operates in this instance is not clear, but if society places an extra value
on the well-being of children, then it may make sense to subsidize
homeownership for that reason. Finally, Oswald (1999) argues that there
is a homeownership-unemployment link. We find little evidence for this
link within the United States, but we agree that slowing mobility may
create problems with the functioning of the labor market. In section 7,
we also attempt to quantify numerically, the externalities from increasing
housing consumption and homeownership. Our primary approach is to
compare the prices of houses that are surrounded by rental and owner-
occupied properties. We control for a wide array of housing and neigh-
borhood characteristics and find that prices rise both with neighborhood
homeownership and with the quality of the housing stock in the local
area.
In section 8, we estimate the impact of the home mortgage interest de-
duction on the homeownership rate. From time series information on the
inflation rate, we conclude that this effect is probably small. Cross-state
evidence also suggests that there is little connection between the size of
the subsidy and the level of homeownership. This finding implies that
the efficiency gains from the interest deduction's impact on homeown-
ership are likely to be small. Even if the externalities from homeownership
are large, the impact of the deduction seems likely to be small enough
that the main consequence of the deduction is redistribution, not changing
behavior. Section 9 concludes the paper.The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 43
2. BASIC FACTS ABOUT ITEMIZATION
AND HOUSING
Figure 2 shows the path of itemization over time in the United States since
1965. In 1950, only 19.4 percent of Americans itemized. Over the 1950's,
this share doubled to 41.1 percent and hit a peak of 47.6 percent in 1970.
Responding, presumably, to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the share of re-
turns that included itemization fell to 34.8 percent by 1972. Between 1972
and 1986, the share of returns that included itemization rose again, to a
peak of 39.1 percent in 1986. Since the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the share of
returns with itemization has been steady: around 30 percent.
The 30 percent of the population who itemize are distributed dispropor-
tionately among the upper income brackets. Table 1 shows the share of
itemizers (and the share of total itemized income) by income decile based
on information from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. Slightly over
one-half of the itemizers are in the top two income deciles. More than 50
percent of the overall itemized income is in the top decile alone. The poor-
est 40 percent of the population contains only 5 percent of the itemizers,
and they are responsible for 3.5 percent of the total itemized income.
Table 1 also shows itemization rates for homeowners and renters by
income bracket. The table makes clear that, among the poorest Americans,
itemization is very rare for either owners or renters. On average, 12.9
percent of homeowners in the bottom 40 percent of the income distribu-
tion itemize. On the other hand, almost 50 percent of people in the top
decile itemize, whether they are owners or not. These facts are not surpris-
ing, but they illustrate the extent to which the home mortgage interest
deduction is targeted toward wealthier Americans.
But homeownership is high even among the rich who don't itemize. In
the top income decile, the share of homeownership among nonitemizers
is still over 75 percent. In Table 2, we look at the relationship between
income and homeownership again using the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances. In regression (1), we find that the marginal effect of the log of
income on the probability of being a homeowner is .19. In regression (2),
this coefficient falls to .13 when we control for itemization. Income still
strongly determines homeownership. Because itemization is itself a func-
tion of homeownership, controlling for itemization is problematic, so
these results are merely descriptive. In regression (3), we control for build-
ing structure and find that the coefficient on income remains at .13.
As the results in column (3) of Table 2 illustrate, homeownership de-
pends to a considerable degree on taste for structure. To explore this is-
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are marginal effects from probit models. All coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level.
detached, which represents 59 percent of the housing stock of the United
States; single-unit attached, which represents 6 percent of the housing
stock; multiunit attached, which represents 30 percent; and mobile homes,
which represent 5 percent of the housing stock. Eighty-five and one-half
percent of people living in single family detached homes are owners, and
85.9 percent of people living in multifamily units are renters. People living
in mobile homes generally also own (79.6 percent). The only category that
is clearly mixed is single-family attached homes, where 53.2 percent own.
Another way of thinking about this relationship is that the correlation
between living in a single-family detached home (or mobile home) and
owning is 58 percent. At the city level (among cities with more than 25,000
inhabitants in 1990), the correlation is even higher—73 percent. Figure 3
shows the relationship between owning and living in single-family de-
tached houses across cities in the United States with more than 25,000
inhabitants. There are few facts in urban economics as reliable as the fact
that people in multifamily units overwhelmingly rent and people in
single-family units overwhelmingly own.
The most convincing theory to explain this fact is that the agency prob-
lems with home maintenance lead to having exactly one owner for each
building, as suggested by Henderson and Ioannides (1983) and Kanemoto
(1990). The literature on home maintenance (DiPasquale and Glaeser,
1999; Shilling, Sirmans, and Dombrow, 1991; and Galster, 1983) documents
that in single-family units, renters take worse care of their homes than
do owners, and that rental homes depreciate faster. This finding is unsur-
prising. Owners face strong incentives to maintain their property; renters46 Glaeser & Shapiro
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family detached in 1990 for places containing 25,000 people or more. Data from the City and County Data
Book, 1994.
face much weaker incentives. The agency problems involved with renting
single-family detached homes (or mobile homes) make it natural for these
structures generally to be owner-occupied.
However, the major maintenance problems in multi-unit dwellings are
all building-, not unit-, specific. A large structure has one boiler, one roof,
and one electrical system. These featers are best maintained by a single
owner. Several owners jointly responsible for maintaining these common
building attributes, creates a huge free-rider problem. As a result, it makes
sense for multi-unit dwellings to be rental units with a single owner.
There is no concrete evidence on the management costs involved in coop-
erative apartment buildings, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the
agency problems are immense.
3 Large amounts of tenant time are fre-
quently spent trying to manage these large structures, and generally this
type of management rarely seems to be efficient. The maintenance prob-
lems appear to be building specific, so agency theory would suggest the
3 One treasurer of a New York City cooperative apartment building describes two primary
sources of waste. First, cooperative apartment owners lack the specialized expertise needed for
large-scale technical problems and complex legal issues. Second, board meetings often devolve
into lengthy debates over unclear property rights and get mired in interpersonal conflict.The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 47
simple rule—one building, one owner—and this is what we generally see
in the United States.
4
This strong relationship between building structure and ownership
means that viewing homeownership solely as a portfolio decision is in-
valid. The homeownership decision generally involves a simultaneous
decision about structure. Subsidizing homeownership will have only
modest short-term effects because the building structure is relatively
fixed. We think that the connection between ownership and structure type
also suggests that subsidizing homeownership may have only modest
long-term effects as well because, in many cases, it would require a very
large subsidy to prompt a well-to-do family of five to live in a multi-unit
building. By the same token, multi-unit areas are unlikely to become filled
with homeowners. Indeed, the massive distortions of rent control only
managed to increase the homeownership rate of New York City—which
is filled with multifamily dwellings—to 30 percent. To us, this situation
implies that the ability to shift multifamily units to cooperative or condo-
minium status has limits.
3. TAXES AND HOUSING
The tax treatment of homes potentially changes behavior along two mar-
gins: the decision to own or rent and the decision of how much housing
to consume. The home mortgage interest deduction both induces individ-
uals to consume more housing and to own the housing that they do con-
sume. In this discussion, we focus on the impact of that deduction, but
other aspects of the tax code (and government policy more broadly) also
affect the homeownership decision.
For example, much literature emphasizes the pro-renter aspects of some
areas of the tax code (see, for example, Gordon, Hines, and Summers,
1987). In particular, the accelerated depreciation schedule for landlords
tends to support the construction of structures relative to other forms of
capital. This feature of the tax code tends to increase the consumption of
rental housing (just like the home mortgage interest deduction). Unlike
the home mortgage interest deduction, it is not as targeted to wealthier
Americans because accelerated depreciation applies to almost all rental
units. This paper will not focus on these issues and will pay more atten-
tion instead to the home mortgage interest deduction alone.
4 There are substantial cross-national differences in ownership patterns that might lead one
to doubt the universal applicability of that rule. Proper analysis of these differences lies
beyond the scope of this paper, but we certainly accept the point that large enough policy
differences toward housing can indeed turn apartment dwellers into owners or people in
single-family houses into renters.48 Glaeser & Shapiro
Because there are two distinct margins that are affected by the home
mortgage interest deduction, it makes sense to separate discussion of tax
reform into two separate questions. First, should the tax system continue
to subsidize the level of housing consumption? (Are there social benefits
from building bigger homes?) Second, should the tax system continue to
subsidize owning relative to renting? (Do we want to encourage Ameri-
cans to own property?)
The efficiency arguments for subsidizing either the level of housing
consumption or homeownership rely on the existence of externalities. The
case against the subsidy focuses on the distortions created by the tax code.
Of course, there may also be desirable or undesirable distribution conse-
quences of transferring from renters to owners and transferring from peo-
ple who consume little housing to people who consume more expensive
housing. It is also possible that there are negative externalities associated
with either ownership or the level of housing consumption.
The literature on the home mortgage interest deduction is oddly bifur-
cated. The authors who focus on the costs of the deduction focus entirely
on the amount of housing consumed. Aaron (1972), Rosen (1979, 1985),
Poterba (1984,1992), and Mills (1987) are but a small sample of the authors
who have looked at the social costs of overconsuming housing due to the
home mortgage interest deduction. The authors who look at the possible
benefits of the deduction look only at the benefits of ownership. This
much smaller group includes DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), Green and
White (1997), and Rossi and Weber (1996). None of their papers even men-
tions the possible costs of overconsuming housing.
We begin with a brief formal analysis, following Poterba (1992), on the
home mortgage interest deduction and the housing capital gains exemp-
tion on the price of housing. To permit this analysis, we look at the impact
of tax policy on the steady-state cost of housing, and we assume (as does
Poterba) that the price of housing is rising deterministically with the level
of inflation. We let n denote the inflation rate, i denote the real interest rate,
x denote the federal income tax rate, and xP denote the local (deductible)
property tax rate. The quantity of housing is denoted as H, and the price
per unit of housing is PH. We assume that the standard deduction is D.
Our one substantive difference from Poterba's model is that we assume
the depreciation and maintenance costs differ for renters and owners. This
assumption is meant to capture the agency costs involved in renting, or
the problems involved in coordinating multiple owners of a multi-unit
dwelling. We denote the total maintenance and depreciation costs as dR
for renters and d0 for owners. Following our previous discussion, we as-
sume that dR is greater than d0 for single-unit dwellings and that d0 is
greater than dR for multi-unit dwellings.The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 49
Free entry of landlords (that is, a zero profit condition) implies that the
free-market rent for a unit of housing equals (i + xP + dR)PH, in after-tax
dollars. For owners who itemize, the per unit cost of housing equals (i +
xP)(l — x) + d0 — ITI)PH- For owners who don't itemize, the per unit cost
of housing equals (i + TP + do~ T0(f + n))PH/ where 6 refers to the fraction
of the house that is financed with the owners' capital (as opposed to debt).
Nonitemizers (as opposed to itemizers) face tax-created incentives to put
everything into their home because the capital gains in that asset are not
taxed. The home mortgage thus provides an incentive for owners who
don't itemize to invest more in housing (at least relative to renters). This
incentive is much higher for individuals who itemize and higher too for
individuals who face high tax rates.
One way to think about this incentive that we will use later is the per-
centage decrease in the price of housing created by the tax code relative
to a nondurable good with a price of 1. The percentage reduction in the
price of owned housing created by the federal tax code equals
+ K +
(i + xP)(l - x) + d0 - xn
If we assume that the real interest rate is 2 percent, the nominal interest
rate is 6 percent, the local property tax rate is 1 percent, the depreciation
and maintenance cost is 3 percent ($3,000 per year on a $100,000 home),
and the federal tax rate is 25 percent, then this number equals 41 percent.
If depreciation and maintenance are as high as 5 percent, then this number
would fall to 28 percent, which is still quite sizable. For nonitemizers, we
have financed 80 percent of their house with their own equity, and the
subsidy equals 7 percent of the cost of the home if maintenance is 3 per-
cent of total costs.
The benefit from owning (as opposed to renting) a house of fixed size
equals (i + n + xP)x + dR — d0) per dollar spent on housing if the individ-
ual itemizes when he or she is both an owner and a renter. If the individ-
ual itemizes only when he or she owns, the incentive to own (again per
dollar spent on housing) equals (i + n + xP)x + dR — d0 — TD/PHH. If the individual doesn't itemize in either case, then the incentive to own
relative to the cost of housing equals x0(f + n) + dR — d0.
Table 3 shows the magnitude of these three tax-related subsidy values
for different parameter values. The tax-related subsidies exclude the
depreciation elements from each expression, and they equal (z + n + xP)x,
(i + n + xP)x - %D/PHH, and xG(z + 7i) for the three always owners,






























































sized the powerful effect that inflation has on the incentive to consume
more housing—but the incentive that inflation creates to own homes is
just as strong. As the table shows, when the inflation rate rises, the subsidy
(at least for the itemizers) rises significantly. For individuals who don't
itemize in either case, the subsidy tends to be small. For example, as the
table shows, a less wealthy individual who has financed 80 percent of the
value of the house with debt and who faces a marginal federal tax of 25
percent and a nominal interest rate of 7 percent, the value of T0(z + n)
equals .35 percent.
It certainly wouldn't surprise us if the difference between dR and d0 is
2 percent (positive for single-family dwellings and negative for multi-unit
homes). In this case, the depreciation-related incentive to own (or rent)
will swamp the tax-related benefits of owning for individuals who don't
itemize in either case. This situation may explain why changes in the tax
subsidy do not seem to change the homeownership rate.
The tax code creates incentives both to consume more housing and for
people to own their homes. These incentives are focused on wealthier
people who are likely to itemize. Among nonitemizers, the incentive to
own increases only for those buyers who pay for a significant fraction of
their own homes. We will return to the impact of changes in the incentive
to own on the homeownership rate, but first we will discuss the incentive
to overconsume, which has received a much larger share of academic
attention.
4. SUBSIDIZING HOUSING CONSUMPTION
The case for subsidizing housing consumption is based on a desire either
to redistribute income to people who buy a lot of housing or to encourageThe Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 51
people to consume more housing. We have little to say about the benefit
of redistributing to those who consume a lot of housing, so we will focus
on the benefits and costs of inducing greater consumption of housing.
The usual justification for a subsidy to something like housing is based
on claims about externalities, i.e., social benefits from housing that are
not internalized by the individuals themselves. By this reasoning, people
generally buy too little housing, and the home mortgage interest deduc-
tion induces them to step up to the plate and consume the size of houses
that they should consume if they internalized all the benefits that more
expensive housing creates for society.
Three main externalities might come from housing consumption. First,
sufficiently poor housing could spread disease and fire. Indeed, through-
out most of history, government intervention in the housing market has
been motivated mainly by a desire to impose minimum standards on
housing to stem the flow of infectious diseases and to reduce the threat
of widespread urban fires. Second, better housing might create aesthetic
amenities that bring pleasure to neighbors and passersby. Third, housing
might benefit children. If the government, in general, cares more about
children relative to parents, and parents care about children relative to
themselves, then there is a case for subsidizing commodities that specifi-
cally benefit children.
The first externality is probably at best minimally relevant in twenty-
first-century America, at least outside the poorest areas. Most people are
living in well-ventilated, relatively fire-resistant homes. Outside the bot-
tom quartile of society, Americans live in good homes. Fire and safety
codes, which are often fairly draconian, appear to be much more effective
in limiting the dangers from fire than a blanket home mortgage interest
deduction.
Given that health and fire externalities are very rare except among the
poorest Americans, the home mortgage interest deduction is poorly de-
signed to correct those externalities. The American Housing Survey
(AHS) also illustrates that wealthier Americans, i.e., Americans in the top
half of the income distribution, are unlikely to live in either crowded or
dangerous housing. For example, 95 percent of the top 70 percent of the
income distribution live in homes with more than 228 square feet per
capita. This number may seem small relative to the newer McMansions,
but it is higher than the median square footage per capita in London,
Paris, or Rome, and it certainly is not crowded by any standard. The AHS
also tells us that home problems, such as leaks and rats, are very rare
among any but the poorest Americans. Indeed, in the entire AHS, more
than 40 percent of the housing problems occur in the poorest 25 percent
of the population and less than 15 percent of this population itemizes,52 Glaeser & Shapiro
even if they own. The home mortgage interest deduction doesn't provide
incentives for the population groups that are really at risk of consuming
substandard housing.
A second externality is aesthetic—perhaps people enjoy looking at fan-
cier homes and, as a result, people should be induced to consume big
houses. In principle, the externality from fancy homes might be either
positive or negative. Living around nicer homes might provide a positive
experience. On the other hand, particularly fancy homes might incite envy
and actually create negative utility. Thus the externality from home qual-
ity is theoretically, at least, ambiguous.
One could easily argue that aesthetic externalities are not really a fit
subject for federal government policy. After all, aesthetic tastes are quite
heterogeneous, and it makes little sense to try to influence these tastes
with federal tax policy. Indeed, zoning and land-use controls appear to be
much more appropriate instruments for internalizing visual externalities.
Localities appear to be quite effective (perhaps too much so) at regulating
the appearance of their homes.
It seems sensible, however, to test whether there is evidence for exter-
nalities from housing consumption. If the evidence suggests large exter-
nalities, particularly among the rich, then there may be a case for
subsidizing the housing consumption of this group through the home
mortgage interest deduction.
The standard approach to quantifying these forms of externalities is to
see whether people pay more for homes in places where other homes
are nicer, i.e., the hedonic approach. In this approach, for each house we
estimate
log(price) = a X attributes + b X neighboring housing quality (1)
+ c X other controls
There are several standard problems with hedonic regressions of this
form. Measured neighborhood home quality is likely to be correlated with
unobserved attributes of the house and neighborhood that also affect the
value of the house. This correlation is likely to bias our estimates upward.
The standard criticisms of hedonic estimation (Epple, 1987) also apply.
Nonetheless, in Table 4, we proceed with a hedonic estimate of the spill-
overs from living around nicer homes. We use the 1993 neighborhood
survey from the American Housing Survey. This survey is a variant of
the standard housing survey with detailed information on housing qual-
ity. The advantage of this neighborhood survey is that the AHS gathers
information on the 10 closest neighbors. We have information on the char-The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 53
acteristics of the neighbors' housing (and their own demographics). This
information can, in principle at least, help us to identify the magnitude
of some spillovers.
Housing prices are self-reported and this feature may create biases.
However, Goodman and Ittner (1992) find that self-reported housing val-
ues generally overstate true values, but that this overstatement is fairly
orthogonal to other features of the house. The bias from self-reported as
opposed to market values is thus not likely to confound our results too
much.
In all of our regressions, we include a large array of standard house
characteristics that are standard in the literature. We are not focused on
the value of the coefficients on these attributes, but rather we see them
as a control. We also include the average education in the 10-house clus-
ter. This control is meant to control for the average human capital level
of community. The estimates in regressions (l)-(3) of Table 4 seem quite
sensible and suggest that housing prices increase by slightly more than
3 percent with each year of schooling in the neighborhood.
In regression (1), we include three measures of average neighborhood
housing quality: mean lot size, mean unit size, and mean number of hous-
ing problems. These averages are based on the housing characteristics of
the other 9 units in the 10-unit cluster. We use a value of 0 for the lot size
of apartments. The housing problems measure is the AHS index measure
for capturing the presence of substandard housing. At the house level,
each new problem is associated with a 9 percent lower housing value.
Both the neighborhood lot size and the unit size coefficients go in the
wrong direction—being around bigger homes reduces housing values.
We interpret these coefficients as showing the omitted variables problems
in these regressions. Presumably, people buy bigger lots in areas that are
cheaper, and so we shouldn't be surprised to see the negative coefficient.
Only the mean number of problems coefficient goes in the expected direc-
tion, and it does suggest that houses are cheaper, holding their character-
istics constant, if their neighbors have more housing problems. Still, the
omitted variables problems continue to make interpretation of this coeffi-
cient difficult.
In regression (2), we include a composite housing quality measure by
using the hedonic parameters estimating a basic housing hedonic. To
make averaging sensible, we regress the housing price itself (not its loga-
rithm) on housing characteristics. We use these estimated coefficients to
create a predicted housing value for each apartment. We take the average
of the predicted house value for the other nine houses in the cluster and
log that average value to get an elasticity. These results are robust to alter-
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We find an overall coefficient of .086, which means that a 1 percent in-
crease in average housing quality in the neighborhood is associated with
an 8.6 percent increase in the value of the house. This coefficient would
imply an optimal subsidy of 8.6 percent to the price of housing (which
is much less than the subsidy that actually exists for itemizers).
In regression (3), we estimate a spline in this average predicted value
parameter. This estimate enables us to check whether the impact of the
average value is different for poorer neighborhoods or for richer neigh-
borhoods. We estimate the impact of average predicted housing values
with two breaks, corresponding to the thirty-third and sixty-sixth percen-
tile of the average home price distribution. Surprisingly, the strongest co-
efficient occurs for the top third of the housing price distribution. There
is no effect of housing quality in the bottom third. The coefficient for the
middle third is .27, and the coefficient for the top third is .4. In principle,
these estimates could justify exactly the subsidy that we see in practice:
a generous housing consumption subsidy oriented toward the top of the
income distribution. Still, we believe that these results are sufficiently rid-
dled with omitted variables problems that we would be loath to accept
them without more proof.
Finally, in regression (4), we use the actual prices of one's neighbors to
estimate the average housing quality in the neighborhood. This variable
has the advantage of capturing unobserved housing attributes. In other
words, if the American Housing Survey does not adequately measure some
housing attributes (say, the aesthetic qualities of the house), then these attri-
butes will still be included in the price. However, this variable has the disad-
vantage of incorporating omitted, neighborhood level characteristics,
which would induce a spurious correlation between the dependent housing
price and the housing prices of the neighboring houses.
Overall, we find a large effect from the average housing price of the
neighbors. The estimated coefficient is .89. In regression (5), we perform
the same spline as in regression (4), but here we use actual housing prices
instead of predicted housing prices. As in the previous regression, we
find that the impact of neighborhood housing price is the same at all hous-
ing quality levels. We are particularly suspicious about these results be-
cause unobserved factors that make houses expensive are likely to affect
the entire neighborhood.
Overall, these results suggest that there may well be externalities in-
volved in consuming more housing. Still, the home mortgage interest de-
duction subsidizes housing consumption beyond the level that would be
justified by our preferred estimates in regression (2).
Finally, it is possible that there is an intergenerational externality re-
lated to housing consumption. In principle, larger, more comfortableThe Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 57
homes may benefit children. If the government cares more about children
(relative to parents) than parents do, then it may make sense to subsidize
homeownership.
5 We don't know of any evidence that documents the
impact of extra space on the outcomes (or happiness) of children, but we
do know that housing consumption and children are clearly comple-
ments. On average, the amount of interior space rises by 48 square feet per
additional child in the American Housing Survey. This complementarity
makes it possible at least that subsidizing housing may yield benefits for
children. Of course, in most cases the disadvantaged children that we are
most concerned about helping will not be affected by the home mortgage
interest deduction.
The complementarity between housing consumption and children
means that the mortgage interest deduction may also have an impact on
fertility. If larger homes make big families possible, then subsidizing
housing will be desirable if the government desires to subsidize fertility.
Indeed, elsewhere we have shown that there is at least some relationship
between fertility and floor area per capita across countries. While this
correlation can be due to reverse causality or omitted variables, it is still
suggestive and at least raises the possibility that the U.S. government's
pro-housing policies may play some role in supporting high American
fertility. Of course, this impact on fertility is only desirable if we want to
subsidize fertility to begin with, a goal that is far from obvious.
4.1 Negative Effects of Subsidizing Housing
Consumption
Numerous papers have talked about the welfare losses from subsidizing
housing consumption in the absence of externalities. These papers have
taken the straightforward economic view that distorting consumption cre-
ates welfare losses relative to an outcome where prices reflect social costs.
However, these losses will increase if there are negative, not positive, ex-
ternalities from certain types of housing consumption. Here, we mention
briefly the possible negative externalities related to subsidizing housing
consumption through the home mortgage interest deduction.
Voith (1999) has argued that subsidizing housing consumption may
indeed be hurting our inner cities. His argument is that, by encouraging
more housing consumption, the home mortgage interest deduction en-
courages people to leave small city apartments to consume larger places
on the fringe of the city. This flight from the city might itself impose nega-
tive social costs on the people who remain in the city.
5 If a parent values his or her child's utility almost as much as his or her own, but the
government values both equally (even if it doesn't care much about either one of them),
then the government should act to create incentives for transfers from parent to child.58 Glaeser & Shapiro
More generally, the home mortgage interest deduction may create neg-
ative effects by disproportionately encouraging spending on housing
among the wealthy, and not among the poor. To the extent to which
spending is limited to structure, this unequal incentive seems unlikely to
cause social problems. However, a significant amount of spending in the
expensive areas of the country is on land, or community amenities, not
on structure (see Glaeser and Gyourko, 2002). Thus, the home mortgage
interest deduction encourages the rich to spend more on community
attributes.
Again, this situation is not necessarily problematic if community attri-
butes are innate items like access to the seacoast, but it is a problem if
the primary community attribute is the average income, or human capital
level, of the community. If we encourage the rich to buy more, then we
encourage the rich to live in particularly high-income communities. In
essence then, the home mortgage interest deduction acts to increase segre-
gation by income. By creating incentives for the rich to spend more on
housing, the home mortgage interest deduction creates incentives for the
rich to live in better neighborhoods, which means that the rich will tend
to segregate more.
To make this concrete, consider the following simple algebraic example.
Consider a world with N rich people and N poor people living in two
communities, each of size N. All houses are identical, except that people
get utility from the percentage of rich people in the community equal
to a X r, where r is the percentage of the community that is rich and a is
an individual specific parameter that is districted on the interval: [aR — e,
ocR + e] for the rich and [aP — e, aP + e] and for the poor, where ocR > aP. The equilibrium condition for this model is that the difference in housing
prices between the two neighborhoods must offset exactly the utility gains
from being in a neighborhood with more rich people. In the absence of
subsidized housing, there will be one rich community with a proportion




and a poor community with a proportion of its residents that are rich
equal to
5 _ aR - ccP
4£
If the tax code subsidizes housing consumption for the rich (and not the
poor) so that they pay only 1 — s of any housing costs, then in the newThe Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 59
equilibrium, the rich community will have a proportion of rich residents
equal to
5 + aR - (1 - s)aP
2(2 - s)e
and the poor community will have a proportion of rich residents equal
to
5 _ aR - (1 - s)aP
5
2(2 - s)£
The degree of segregation (i.e., the share of the rich who live in the rich
community) rises with the degree of subsidization. Any policy that makes
it cheaper for the rich (relative to the poor) to live in the more expensive
neighborhood will tend to increase the degree of segregation in society.
Conversely, a policy that disproportionately subsidizes the housing con-
sumption of the poor (perhaps Section 8 vouchers) would act to decrease
income segregation.
6
Cutler and Glaeser (1997) argue that black-white segregation is quite
harmful to African-Americans. If subsidizing housing consumption abets
this segregation, then it will create negative externalities for African-
Americans. Because we do not have meaningful estimates of the impact
of the subsidy on the level of segregation, it is impossible at this time to
calculate the welfare costs from this aspect of housing subsidy. Still, we
highlight this potential negative impact of the home mortgage interest
deduction as a topic for future research.
5. THE EXTERNALITIES FROM OWNERSHIP
We now switch from considering the housing consumption margin to
considering the ownership margin. The bulk of the discussion about the
benefits of the home mortgage interest deduction has focused on this mar-
gin and the externalities from homeownership. At this point, we address
first the issue of whether there are externalities from homeownership,
and if so, how important they are. Then we turn to the issue of whether
the home mortgage interest deduction does a good job of promoting
homeownership.
6 Indeed, Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001) find that voucher recipients tend to use their
vouchers to move to low-poverty neighborhoods, even when there is nothing explicit about
the voucher that subsidizes nonpoor neighborhoods.60 Glaeser & Shapiro
The economics literature points to three reasons why homeownership
might create externalities. First, homeowners own an asset whose value
is tied to the strength of their community. Thus, they have an incentive
to act (and vote) for policies and practices that will make their community
more attractive. This civic participation may take the form of community
activism or contributions to public goods. Of course, free-rider problems
still exist, but the property stake in the community creates at least a small
incentive to keep the community strong.
This scenario becomes particularly clear in the case of elections. Home-
owners tend to prefer government actions that promote the value of their
property. In many cases, these actions may be long-term investments that
raise the long-term prospects of the community. Because housing is a
long-lived asset, it will incorporate expectations about the results of gov-
ernment investment, and owners will reap benefits from long-term gov-
ernment incentives.
Conversely, renters have no financial stake in strengthening the com-
munity and they can even lose from investments that strengthen the com-
munity because rents are not fixed. If these investments are sufficiently
attractive to outsiders, then they will raise rents more than they raise the
utility of the renters directly and the renters may lose. Thus, renters are
likely to prefer direct government handouts that come to them, while
owners will be more likely to trade off such handouts for investments in
the community. (The algebra of this argument is given in DiPasquale and
Glaeser, 1999.)
The political interest of homeowners has a dark side. Owners face in-
centives to raise house prices by any means possible. In some cases, im-
proving the community is a natural means of raising prices. In other cases,
stopping a new supply of housing is a more effective means of raising
prices. Thus, homeowners are likely to act like local monopolists and try
to cut off new supply.
The second reason why homeownership creates externalities is that it
creates barriers to mobility. There are few economic assets with transac-
tion costs that are big as those involved in home sales. Real estate agents
who typically charge between 3 and 6 percent of the value of the house
are not uncommon, and both sellers and buyers bear other costs as well.
These costs mean that homeowners move much less often than renters
do. Indeed, the 2000 Current Population Survey tells us that 32.5 percent
of renters changed homes in the previous year, while only 9.1 percent of
owners changed houses over the same period.
These costs become exacerbated in down markets, where the leverage
created by mortgages means that owners have frequently lost most of
their equity. As a result, they may have lost their ability to make a downThe Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 61
payment elsewhere and they find themselves fixed. (This argument is
made by Stein, 1995.) As we will discuss later, this permanence, par-
ticularly in declining areas, may be harmful because people become
trapped in high unemployment areas. Still, there may also be benefits
from permanence.
The incentive to invest in a community and in social connections de-
pends on one's time horizon. Individuals who expect to live in an area
for only a few months are unlikely both to make friends and to join local
organizations. People who are fixed have much more to gain from con-
necting with others. Likewise, long time horizons will increase the returns
to becoming informed about local issues. They will reap the returns from
these investments over time. If investment in social connections yields
externalities, then this permanence will create positive externalities.
The third possible way in which homeownership might generate exter-
nalities is through home maintenance and gardening. Homeowners face
incentives to take better care of their homes than do renters. If some of
this care creates aesthetic externalities, then homeownership may yield
benefits through greater care. Of course, for this externality to be impor-
tant, landlords must take worse care of their homes than homeowners.
There are two approaches to measuring the externalities from home-
ownership. The first, and most direct way, is to examine an activity that
is believed to yield externalities, for example, gardening or joining clubs,
and see whether homeowners do more of this activity than renters. In
other words, to run a regression of the form:
outcome = a + b X homeownership + c X other controls (2)
This approach is taken by Rossi and Weber (1996), Green and White
(1997), and DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999). In some cases, it may make
sense to examine community level aggregates of this activity and to see
if it is correlated with the community level homeownership rate:
average outcome = a + b X homeownership rate
(3) + c X other controls
The biggest problem with this approach is that homeowners differ from
renters along different dimensions. Indeed, as section 2 emphasized,
homeowners are likely to be older and richer. Of course, multivariate re-
gressions can control for observable characteristics that are correlated
with homeownership. More problematic are the characteristics (e.g., re-
sponsibility or patience) that are likely both to generate homeownership62 Glaeser & Shapiro
and to influence socially beneficial activities. The biases created by omit-
ted variables are likely to be severe and make almost all estimation of
this type somewhat dubious.
There are two common approaches to this type of problem. In some
cases, it may be possible to use longitudinal data and look at how people
change their behavior when they become homeowners. This approach
eliminates at least any time-invariant individual characteristics that are
likely to be correlated with homeowner ship. However, this approach can-
not deal with time-varying individual heterogeneity, and this form of het-
erogeneity is likely to be important. If we see someone become more
responsible when he or she buys a home, is it the result of the home, or
has the individual just matured a little? Still, we believe that longi-
tudinal data is ultimately the best approach to this problem. However,
the only use of longitudinal data in this area was done on German data
by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) and yielded, at best, mixed results.
The reason why longitudinal data is so desirable is that the alternative
identification strategy, the instrumental variables approach, seems un-
likely to yield convincing results. The instrumental variables approach
relies on some natural experiment that increased the homeownership rate
and didn't have any other correlation with the relevant outcome. Past
attempts at instrumental variables approaches include Green and White's
(1997) use of the ratio between rental prices and housing costs. While this
attempt is certainly valiant, this ratio is not exogenous and seems likely
to be both correlated with and potentially caused by a large number of
area level characteristics that are likely to be correlated with outcomes of
interest. Likewise, DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) use statewide variation
in the homeownership rate for different demographic subgroups. Again,
this attempt suggests more courage than wisdom because these aggregate
rates are unlikely to satisfy the relevant orthogonality condition.
There are several reasons why successful instrumental variables strate-
gies have been elusive. Location-level attributes that influence homeown-
ership, such as the housing stock, are likely to have a direct impact on
the many outcomes. The share of the housing stock that is detached ex-
plains most of the variation in the homeownership rate across cities. Be-
cause this housing stock variable is highly correlated with the entire
spatial structure of the city, it is very likely to have a direct effect on most
outcomes of interest.
Second, if an exogenous attribute makes homeownership cheaper, then
it will attract people who are inclined toward homeownership. This mi-
gration effect is potentially quite serious. Consider two locales: one subsi-
dizes homeownership and the other doesn't. In principle, this subsidy
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ever, people who are prone to own homes will move into one locale and
rent-prone individuals will move into the other. The differences across
the communities are quite likely to be caused by omitted individual char-
acteristics of the people.
If there is a change in policy, and we believe that this change moves
the homeownership rate faster than it influences migration, then in princi-
ple we might be able to use the changes in the locale's outcome as a test
of the effect of homeownership. Monroe (2001) represents this work best.
Monroe looked at branch banking at the state level and found that, when
states allowed branch banking, their homeownership rate increased. Un-
fortunately, the changes in the state homeownership level tended to be
too small to identify the impact of homeownership with any precision.
Ideally, there would be some sort of government policy that is specific to
the individual, not the locale. By comparing individuals who had access to
the policy with identical individuals who didn't, we might be able to test
for the impact of homeownership. Of course, such a policy would need to
be free of other effects, and in particular free of an independent income
effect. In practice, most pro-homeownership policies have tended also to
transfer large amounts of wealth to treatment groups. As a result, any effects
represent the combined impact of homeownership and greater wealth.
The second approach to measuring the externalities from homeown-
ership is indirect. Instead of seeing whether homeowners differ from rent-
ers, we test the impact of living around homeownership on housing
prices. In other words, we estimate a variant of regression (1):
log (price) = a X house attributes + b
X neighborhood homeownership rate (4)
+ c X other controls
This approach tries to determine whether housing prices are higher in
neighborhoods where other people own homes, and it is obviously also
problematic. The neighborhood homeownership rate is likely to be corre-
lated with other neighborhood attributes, such as low housing costs
(which would bias the estimate of b downward) or attractive neighbor-
hood amenities (which would bias the estimate of b upward).
Still, in principle, we can try to control for location-specific amenities.
The primary advantage of this approach is that it gives us an actual dollar
estimate for the value of homeownership. We believe that this approach
makes more sense at the local level, where patterns of homeownership
may be somewhat random, than at the city level, where high levels of
homeownership are almost completely determined by the housing stock,64 Glaeser & Shapiro
which is itself so important in driving prices. We will turn to this ap-
proach later when we try to put a dollar value on the externalities from
homeownership.
6. EVIDENCE ON THE EXTERNALITIES FROM
HOMEOWNERSHIP
We now discuss the evidence on homeownership and several potentially
externality-creating activities. First, we discuss the connection between
homeownership and home maintenance/gardening. While this connec-
tion is in a sense the most mundane, it is also the strongest. Next, we
discuss the connection between homeownership and social connections.
We then turn to the connection between homeownership and political
behavior. We end this section by discussing other externalities potentially
related to homeownership.
6.1 Homeownership and Maintenance/Gardening
Home maintenance and gardening are likely to lead to a more pleasant
neighborhood and generate externalities. In section 4, we found that
neighborhood home values rise with housing quality. The attention that
homeowners' groups pay to enforcing local rules for housing and garden
maintenance also provides anecdotal information that supports the exis-
tence of externalities from these activities.
A rich body of evidence supports the connection between homeown-
ership and home maintenance. Authors like Galster (1983) and DiPas-
quale and Glaeser (1999) have shown that homeowners are more likely
to engage in home maintenance and gardening. DiPasquale and Glaeser
(1999) find that the homeownership effect on housing repairs even sur-
vives in longitudinal data with individual fixed effects. Shilling, Sirmans,
and Dombrow (1991) show that the rate at which property depreciates is
a function of homeownership. If we believe the above estimates, which
suggest that the value of a home is a function of the average quality of
homes in the neighborhood, then these home maintenance effects will
increase the value of homes in the area.
The raw correlation between homeownership and gardening or home
maintenance is quite large. If we consider only people who live in single-
family detached homes, 73.4 percent of owners garden and 49.5 percent
of renters garden in the General Social Survey. DiPasquale and Glaeser
(1999) report in their German sample that 33 percent of renters report
doing home repair or yard work and 57 percent of owners report doing
the same activities. This difference in the German data drops in half withThe Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 65
individual fixed effects, which means that there is still a 10 percent differ-
ence in the rate at which people maintain their homes.
The net effect of these maintenance differentials is that homeowners live
in considerably less dilapidated surroundings than renters. Among the set
of owner-occupied, single-family detached homes in the American Hous-
ing Survey, 3.1 percent have open cracks or holes in the wall or ceiling.
The comparable number for rented single-family detached homes is 10.2
percent. Likewise, 2.8 percent of owner-occupied homes have broken
plaster or peeling paint, and 1.7 percent have signs of rats or mice. The
comparable numbers for rented units are 7.5 percent and 5.4 percent, respec-
tively. It is hard to know the extent to which these differences reflect intrin-
sic differences in the units or between the residents that are unrelated to
homeownership. Still, the gaps are striking enough that they add some
credibility to the view that homeowners take better care of their property.
When we turn to the hedonic estimates, we will be able to control for hous-
ing quality, and we will thus have an estimate of the extent to which the ex-
ternalities from homeownership work through better home maintenance.
6.2 Homeownership and Social Capital
The evidence for social groups and homeowners likewise consists primar-
ily of large correlations without any strong evidence for causality. Table
5 shows the membership patterns of owners and renters in the General
Social Survey. Owners are more likely than renters to join in every form
of group membership. At the bottom of the table, we see two aggregate
measures: the types of organizations to which the individual belongs and
the frequency with which the individual socializes with his or her neigh-
bors. For both of these variables, homeowners are also more social.
The third column shows the marginal effect estimated in a probit re-
gression where we control for age, age
2, education level, income level (and
a dummy variable for cases where income is missing), marital status, gen-
der, race, and living in a single-family detached home. Many of these
differences become insignificant once we control for other individual at-
tributes, but all but two remain positive. The variable that aggregates
group membership remains quite significant, but the socialization vari-
able does not.
The endogeneity of homeownership remains worrisome, and it is
certainly possible that the correlation between homeownership and
group membership stems mainly from unobserved variables that make
people more likely to be homeowners and make them more likely to join
groups. One possible approach is to use an instrument that increases
homeownership and does not have a direct impact on group members.
In Table 6, we use the share of the population in a metropolitan area66 Glaeser & Shapiro
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* Based on authors' calculations from General Social Survey. Details on the survey are available at
www.icpsr.umich.edu. Probit regressions include controls for income, a dummy for missing income, age,
age
2, educational attainment, a dummy for single-family detached house, gender, race, and marital status.
+ Indicates that difference in membership rates by homeownership is significant at 5 percent level.
J Indicates that probit coefficient is significant at 5 percent level.
§ Indicates that probit coefficient is significant at 10 percent level.
that lives in single-family detached housing in 1980 as an instrument for
homeownership. As we discussed above, this variable is strongly corre-
lated with homeownership. This element of the housing stock is reason-
ably exogenous. The main problem with it as an instrument is that people
may select across metropolitan areas and as such there may be a correla-
tion, through this migration, between the variable and unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneity. Nevertheless, we proceed using this variable as an
instrument for homeownership in the organizations regression. We find
that, after controlling for observable characteristics, the coefficient on
homeownership remains large (indeed, it grows) but becomes statistically
insignificant. Overall, we find these results provocative but far from com-
pelling. There is clearly a correlation between homeownership and group
membership, but at this stage we cannot be sure of a large, causal link.The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 67
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* Based on authors' calculations from General Social Survey. Details on the survey are available at
www.icpsr.umich.edu. Column IV indicates the percentage of single-family detached housing in metro-
politan area in 1980 used in a probit model to produce a predicted probability of being a homeowner.
Standard errors in column IV regressions adjusted for clustering on metropolitan area.
6.3 Politics and Homeownership
A second channel through which homeownership might create externali-
ties is the political process. Homeownership should give people more in-
centive to be involved politically. It may also get them to make political
choices that favor the long-run health of their community (which will
create higher housing prices). Conversely, as DiPasquale and Glaeser
(1999) show, renters have an incentive to favor policies that bring immedi-
ate benefits relative to long-run gains.
In Table 7, we use data from the General Social Survey to show the connec-
tion between homeownership and several political variables. The first two68 Glaeser & Shapiro
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* Based on authors' calculations from General Social Survey. Details on the survey are available at
www.icpsr.umich.edu. Probit regressions include controls for income, a dummy for missing income, age,
age
2, squared, educational attainment, a dummy for single-family detached house, gender, race, and
marital status.
t Indicates that difference in rates by homeownership is significant at 5 percent level.
X Indicates that probit coefficient is significant at 5 percent level.
rows show that homeowners are more likely to be informed about political
figures. The first row shows that 36.8 percent of homeowners know the
name of the local school board head and that 22.2 percent of renters have
the same knowledge. This effect isn't just the result of homeowners having
children. When we control for a wide array of background characteristics,
the gap between owners and renters remains large and significant.
In the second row, we show that 22.1 percent of renters know the name
of their U.S. representative and 43.2 percent of owners know the same
information. This gap drops in half when we control for other characteris-
tics, but the difference remains significant. There does appear to be a sig-
nificant difference in political knowledge associated with homeowning.
The third row of the table shows that 52.4 percent of renters and 76.5
percent of homeowners report that they have voted in local elections. When
we include our other controls, this difference drops to 10.75 percent, which
is still quite significant. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) found that this effect
does not decline when they control for years of residence in the community.
As usual, we cannot be sure that homeownership isn't proxying for other
omitted characteristics. Still, there appears to be significant evidence for the
hypothesis that homeowners are more politically involved in local affairs.
We also look at the connection between homeownership and people
saying that they have worked to solve local problems. This variable is
self-reported and hard to interpret. Still, the difference between home-
owners and renters is striking: 39 percent of owners say that they have
worked to solve local problems; 24.6 percent of renters make the same
claim. This gap falls to 9.3 percent once we control for other attributes.
Certainly, this finding presents some evidence supporting the view that
homeownership creates incentives to improve the neighborhood.The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 69
Another approach to this issue is to look at the association between local
government spending patterns and homeownership. While we do not have
actual voting records across communities, we do have local public finance
variables from the City and County Data Book. These variables are difficult
to interpret because they represent only spending by the locality itself. Thus,
if the locality is in a state that generally takes responsibility for a larger share
of certain types of spending, this fact will influence our variables. We try
to correct for this problem by including state fixed effects. We also control
for income, age, education, and population density in the locality. With
these controls, we find the following two results for data in 1990:
log(per capita expenditures) = - .026 X homeownership rate (5)
and
log(percent of spending on welfare) = -0.019
(ft) X homeownership rate
The standard error on the homeownership coefficient in the first regres-
sion is .005, and the standard error in the second regression is .004. The
number of observations in both regressions is 1,076. We also found that
homeownership reduces the share of spending on health and hospitals
and increases spending on highways.
While these results are certainly open to debate, they suggest that
homeownership is associated with lower per capita spending and less
spending on transfers. The interpretation of this finding is that homeown-
ers may work harder to keep taxes down and to avoid transfers, which
do not build long-run property values. While these effects of homeown-
ership are not unambiguously positive, they do support the hypothesis
that homeownership alters political behavior.
Homeowners face incentives to invest in their communities; they also
face incentives to restrict the supply of new housing to raise prices.
Through zoning and other land-use controls, economics predicts that
homeowners will work hard to ensure that no substitutes for their houses
are brought on the market. This attempt to restrict supply will impose
costs on people who want to live in the area and should be seen as a
negative consequence of homeownership.
To show the impact of homeownership on the desire for zoning, we
looked at all local voting measures submitted as referenda in California in
2000. A typical measure was a San Francisco referendum on the following
question:70 Glaeser & Shapiro
Shall the rules that govern converting rental housing to condominiums also apply
to converting rental housing to certain forms of joint ownership with exclusive
rights of occupancy, and shall the annual 200-unit cap on such conversions be
made permanent?
Other measures similarly restricted new owner-occupied housing or
made it easier for communities to do so. The relationship across voting
units between homeownership and support for the measures is shown in
Figure 4. The underlying regression is:
percentage pro-zoning = 19 .2 + .5 X homeownership, N = 30, R
2 = .197 (7)
(.12) (.2)
Standard errors are in parentheses. The positive effects of homeownership
on local quality should be weighed against its negative effect on re-
stricting the supply of new construction.





















Percentage owner-occupied, 1990 89.4
* Percentage owner-occupied is based on U.S. counties, 1998, and City and County Data Book, 1994, as
appropriate for the jurisdiction. Percentage voting for measure refers to the percentage of voters support-
ing the year 2000 zoning measure proposed in the California jurisdiction. Data on voting on local mea-
sures taken from the California Local Elections Data Archive, 2000, available at http://www.csus.edu/
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6.4 Other Externalities: Voting, Children,
and Unemployment
Another possible externality that may be related to homeownership is
investment in children. Research by Green and White (1997) showed that
children of homeowners are about 25 percent less likely to drop out of
school than children of comparable renters. This effect is strikingly large
in magnitude and quite robust across specifications and across data sets.
Green and White (1997) showed that this effect holds in the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics, the High School and Beyond Survey, and the Current
Population Survey.
Of course, as discussed above, the natural objection to this research is
that homeownership is endogenous and likely to be correlated with other
parental characteristics that may well create good outcomes for children.
For example, more future-oriented parents may be more likely both to
save to buy homes and to invest in their children. This effect may well
be the result of spurious correlation, just as the results of DiPasquale and
Glaeser, (1999) might be. Also, the theoretical grounds for believing in
this connection are not obvious. Perhaps the permanence and community
investment created by homeowners helps children, but it isn't clear why.
Green and White (1997) were well aware of this problem and tried to
address it using a measure of relative housing cost, which reflects the
ratio of housing prices to local rents. Using this measure as an instrument,
they still found significant effects of homeownership on the dropout rate.
Of course, one could also argue that these variables are themselves also
likely to be correlated with omitted characteristics related to the outcomes
of children. Still, the fact is striking and certainly worthy of more research.
As we discussed above, an externality related to the raising of children
exists if the government cares more about the children relative to parents,
and if parents care about children relative to themselves. The positive
effects of homeownership on children may be the best argument for subsi-
dizing homeownership, if indeed these effects are found to be causal.
Given the importance and ambiguities surrounding Green and White's
results, it seems clear that this question needs additional research.
A final set of externalities connected to homeownership might work
through the unemployment rate. In some very highly publicized research,
Oswald (1999) argued that high homeownership rates lead to high levels
of unemployment. He showed across regions in Europe that homeown-
ership and unemployment tended to go together. His argument is that
homeownership creates barriers to mobility and that these barriers stop
workers from moving in response to labor market shock. In areas with72 Glaeser & Shapiro
renters, people can move quickly in response to a shock. In areas with
homeowners, the workers are less mobile.
We think that three issues are in line with this research. First, Glaeser and
Gyourko (2001) argued that durable housing means that the overall housing
stock is fixed, even if the residents are renters. Population levels tend to
decline only very slowly in response to negative labor supply shocks, even
when the population is made up of renters. In a world of renters, adjustment
to a local downturn is not easy. Renting makes it easy only for one group
of residents to flee and be replaced by another group of residents. Glaeser
and Gyourko (2001) claimed that this fixed nature of houses helps us to
understand why low human capital people sort into declining cities. If
there are huge welfare gains from this sorting, then renting is beneficial,
but there needs to be gains from sorting, not just gains from emigration.
Second, the case for a homeownership-unemployment connection in the
United States seems empirically quite weak. For example, across U.S. cities,
the correlation between homeownership and unemployment is —42 per-
cent. This negative relationship remains when we control for per capita
income and human capital variables. Far from increasing unemployment,
homeownership appears to be correlated negatively with unemployment.
We certainly wouldn't interpret this relationship to be causal, and we cer-
tainly believe that omitted variables are likely to explain it. Still, the negative
relationship does push us away from believing the Oswald hypothesis.
Third, the negative effect of homeownership on mobility is not itself evi-
dence of any sort of externalities, even if it leads to unemployment. Housing
economists have long emphasized the fixed costs involved in buying a house
and that homeownership increases mobility costs. In general, these higher
costs are internalized by the homeowner. Only if externalities are related
to unemployment, perhaps through the tax structure and unemployment
benefits, does a correlation between unemployment and homeownership
create a case for taxing (as opposed to subsidizing) homeownership.
7. HEDONIC ESTIMATES OF THE
EXTERNALITIES FROM HOMEOWNERSHIP
There is substantial evidence suggesting that homeowners take better care
of their homes and that they are also more likely to join social groups.
Does any of this matter? Do these activities increase the willingness of
neighbors to pay for proximity to homeowners? To answer these ques-
tions, we turn again to the neighborhood module from the American
Housing Survey. As discussed above, we use the average homeownership
rate in the neighborhood as our key variable and we control for (1) the
average level of neighborhood human capital, (2) the average predictedThe Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 73
housing value of neighboring houses described aboved and (3) the usual
collection of individual house characteristics.
We report our basic results in regression (1) of Table 8. We find that a
10 percent increase in the local homeownership rate is associated with a
2.5 percent increase in housing values. This result echoes the much more
sophisticated findings of Coulson, Hwang, and Imai (2001), who also use
this sample to document positive spillovers from homeownership. How-
ever, they, use a selection model that actually attempts to deal with sort-
ing across communities.
In regression (2), we test the hypothesis that the effect of homeownership
is mainly due to home maintenance by controlling for the average number
of housing problems in the neighborhood. When we include this control,
the coefficient on homeownership falls by half and becomes only marginally
significant. One natural interpretation of this regression is that most of the
benefits from local homeownership comes from better housing maintenance.
Finally, in regression (3), we include a control for the share of houses that
are single-family detached dwellings. This variable has a negative impact
on housing prices presumably because people are more likely to build
multi-unit dwellings in areas where land costs are high. When we control
for this variable, we find that the coefficient on the average homeownership
rate doubles. Now a 10 percent increase in the neighborhood homeown-
ership rate is associated with a 4.7 percent increase iri housing values.
In regressions (4)-(6), we repeat regressions (l)-(3) but we include met-
ropolitan area fixed effects to account for any cross-city heterogeneity.
The results are smaller and less precisely estimated, but they are generally
still significant.
A final piece of evidence on the impact of homeowners on localities is
their impact on local growth. In past work (e.g., Glaeser et al., 1995), one
of us has used city growth regressions as a means of testing whether a
particular attribute is good for a city. Thus, the generally strong positive
relationship between local schooling levels and local growth has been in-
terpreted as evidence that local human capital is an engine of local innova-
tion and growth. Thus, it makes sense to check whether homeownership
is positively related to local growth.
In Figure 5, we show the positive relationship between homeownership
and population growth at the city level between 1990 and 2000 for cities
with more than 50,000 inhabitants. The underlying regression is:
population growth = -.024 + .22
(.03) (.05) (8)
X homeownership rate, N = 503, R
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* Percentage owner-occupied in 1990 and 1990 population are taken from the City and County Data Book,
1994. Sample includes all cities with 50,000 people or more in 1990. Population in 2000 is from Census 2000
data, available at www.census.gov. See Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) for more details about growth data.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The relationship is certainly not over-
whelming, but it does indicate that cities with more homeownership have
done well at attracting additional residents over the past decade. Cer-
tainly, none of this evidence shows conclusively that there are positive
jurisdictional spillovers from homeownership, but it does, at least, leave
the matter open.
8. DOES THE HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST
DEDUCTION PROMOTE HOMEOWNERSHIP?
In the previous three sections, we have discussed the evidence on the pres-
ence of externalities from homeownership. We believe that this evidence
is weak but suggestive. However, any evaluation of the home mortgage
interest deduction and homeownership should also ask the following ques-
tion: does the deduction have any impact at all on homeownership? Be-
cause homeownership is tied so closely to structure type and because the
groups that appear most likely to be on the margin between renting and
owning don't itemize in either case, it seems reasonably likely that theThe Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 77
home mortgage interest deduction has a very small impact on the overall
homeownership rate. In this section, we marshal some evidence on the
connection between the deduction and the homeownership rate.
Our first pieces of evidence use the time series over the past 40 years.
We know from section 3 that the ownership subsidy created by the tax
code is (i + n + xP)x per dollar spent on housing if the individual itemizes
when she or he is both an owner and a renter, (i + n + xP)x — TD/PHH
if she or he itemizes only when she or he owns, and X0(z + 7i) if she
or he doesn't itemize in either case. In all cases, the subsidy is roughly
proportional to the nominal interest. Thus, a doubling of the nominal in-
terest rate will cause the subsidy roughly to double (because the nominal
interest rate is several times as large as the property tax rate).
Of course, the nominal interest rate also causes the price of housing to
rise. A better test of the importance of the subsidy is to see whether changes
in inflation cause the homeownership rate to rise. In a world without the
deduction, changes in inflation should not really affect the level of home-
ownership. After all, as Poterba (1984) documents, the real cost of funds
is relatively independent of inflation. The one clear impact of the level of
inflation is that it increases the tax-created subsidy for owning a home.
A second time series test of the importance of the homeownership rate is
the role of itemization. Clearly, as the level of itemization increases (for rea-
sons other than homeownership), the subsidy to homeownership should
go up. Likewise, if the government increases the standard deduction in an
attempt to simplify the tax code and reduce itemization, then homeown-
ership should fall, if the tax subsidy is at all important. Thus, our second time
series test of the importance of the home mortgage interest deduction is to
see whether changes in the degree of itemization cause the level of homeown-
ership to increase. Of course, there is a natural spurious positive correlation
that occurs because homeowners are more likely to itemize than renters;
thus, the coefficient will tend to be an overestimate of the true coefficient.
Table 9 shows our results. Using quarterly data since 1971, regression (1)
shows the relationship between the subsidy rate and the level of homeown-
ership. Increases in subsidy cause the homeownership rate to increase, but
the effect is slight and insignificant. A1 percent increase in the subsidy rate
causes homeownership to rise by .0009 percent. In regression (2), we show
that this result remains unchanged when we control for the conventional
mortgage interest rate (which has its predicted negative sign). Regression
(3) includes demographic controls, following Rosen and Rosen (1980).
In regression (4), we look at itemization. In this case, there is a signifi-
cant negative relationship, which goes in the wrong direction. This coeffi-
cient becomes insignificant when we control for the conventional
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Figures 1 and 2. Over the past 40 years, the inflation rate and the share
of people who itemize both have had major ups and downs. The home-
ownership rate has been extraordinarily flat, and the immobility of the
homeownership rate serves as evidence for the weak connection between
the home mortgage interest deduction and the level of homeownership.
To explore this relationship further, we look at cross-state data within
the United States. From the TAXSIM database from the National Bureau of
Economic Research (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993), we extract a measure at the
extent to which the mortgage interest subsidy differs by state. This subsidy
represents the marginal subsidy to mortgage interest raced by an average
taxpayer in the state. Figure 6 shows the cross-state variation in the degree
of mortgage subsidy and its relationship to the homeownership rate. States
with a larger subsidy tend to have slightly lower homeownership rates, but
there is essentially no relationship. Figure 7 shows the relationship between
changes in the degree of mortgage subsidy and changes in the homeown-





Mortgage interest subsidy, 2000
* Homeownership rate is percentage of housing owner-occupied in 2000. Data from www.census.gov.
Mortgage interest subsidy is marginal subsidy to mortgage interest of average taxpayer by state from
1990 to 2000. Income distribution held fixed. Data from www.nber.org/taxsim. See Feenberg and Coutts
(1993) for details on the TAXSIM model. In particular, the mortgage interest subsidy is calculated as
follows: nationally representative data on income in 1995 is deflated as appropriate for each year and
used to calculate the state income tax liabilities owed by each person in the state-year cell. Then mortgage
interest is increased by 1 percent for each taxpayer, the state tax is recalculated, and a marginal tax is
calculated as the ratio of additional tax to additional mortgage interest. More details are available at
http: / / www.nber.org / taxsim / state-avr-rates / index.html.80 Glaeser & Shapiro
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Change in mortgage interest subsidy, 1990-2000
* Change in homeownership rate is change in percentage of housing owner-occupied from 1990 to 2000.
Data from www.census.gov. Change in mortgage interest subsidy is change in marginal subsidy to mort-
gage interest of average taxpayer by state from 1990 to 2000. Income distribution held fixed. Data from
www.nber.org/taxsim. See Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for details on the Taxsim model. In particular, the
mortgage interest subsidy is calculated as follows: nationally representative data on income in 1995 is
deflated as appropriate for each year and used to calculate the state income tax liabilities owed by each
person in the state-year cell. Then mortgage interest is increased by 1 percent for each taxpayer, the state
tax is recalculated, and a marginal tax is calculated as the ratio of additional tax to additional mortgage
interest. More details are available at http: / / www.nber.org/~taxsim/state-avr-rates/index.html.
ership rate between 1990 and 2000. Again, there is essentially no relation-
ship. This data further confirms our basic point: the home mortgage interest
deduction doesn't have much to do with the homeownership rate.
9. CONCLUSION
We have argued that there is a limited body of evidence suggesting that
homeownership creates positive spillovers for nearby neighbors. Home-
owners do appear to be more active citizens: they vote more; they take
better care of their homes. Houses that are surrounded by homeowners
are worth a little more than houses that are surrounded by renters. There
are also negative aspects to homeownership. Homeowners respond more
slowly to labor market shocks, and they vote to constrict the new housing
supply. Still, there is enough evidence to support the view that pro-home-
ownership policies are at least possibly beneficial.The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 81
However, the home mortgage interest deduction is really not a pro-
homeownership policy in any meaningful sense. It subsidizes housing
consumption, but its impact on the homeownership rate appears to be
minimal. This finding seems to occur because homeownership is strongly
determined by choice of structure type, i.e., living in a single-family
detached home, and because the poorer people who are on the home-
ownership margin generally don't itemize, even if they own. Our best
evidence on the irrelevance of the deduction compared to the homeown-
ership rate is that, over the past 40 years, as the deduction's implicit sub-
sidy has soared and crashed, the rate of homeownership has barely
budged.
The home mortgage interest deduction needs to be judged on other
grounds. Is it desirable as a means of making the income tax schedule
less progressive? Is it desirable as a subsidy to housing consumption? The
home mortgage interest deduction may or may not make sense, but it
does not have a major impact on the homeownership rate, and the exter-
nalities from homeownership (if they exist) cannot be used as a justifica-
tion for the deduction. Instead, other government policies, particularly
those that reduce the down-payment levels for poorer Americans, are a
much more effective means of influencing the level of homeownership.
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